The stunning victory of the AfD in the Saxony-Anhalt elections must not be downplayed in any way. True, it is a small eastern Land (with just over 2 million inhabitants)—Germany’s poorest, with a large elderly population and a region hit hard by deindustrialization. But so what? It is certainly not the only Land experiencing the impoverishment of the working class and the middle class alike, driven by the decline of German industry and the economy in the face of surging competition from China and Asia, particularly in the automotive sector. Nor is East Germany the only area where the AfD is growing rapidly; national polls now place the party not far off the 30% mark. It is likely that Berlin—where the party has never previously made a major breakthrough—will also confirm this rise tomorrow, albeit with numerical figures vastly different from those in Saxony-Anhalt. Moreover, the jubilation expressed by right-wing movements worldwide—from Trump’s camp to our own domestic parties (led by the League and Futuro Nazionale)—over the Brandenburg results is enough to highlight the international nature of the phenomenon.
The Causes
Let us, therefore, take these events seriously. We begin with the record voter turnout: 77.8%, compared to 60.3% in 2021 and the all-time low of 44.4% in 2006. Around 170,000 people who had previously abstained felt strongly motivated to go out and vote—predominantly for the AfD. It was a vote that clearly cut across class lines: the AfD was supported by 35% of voters who described their economic situation as “good”—affluent members of the middle and lower-middle classes (below the 43.8% the party achieved overall)—as well as by 65% of voters facing economic hardship, 59% of blue-collar workers who turned out to vote, and 57% of those with low levels of education. Consequently, the massive vote from social sectors facing impoverishment and anxiety about the future proved decisive. It was a vote mainly by men. Surveys by Infratest Dimap indicate that 20% of AfD voters share the party’s far-right ideology and 18% hold views that are unequivocally right-wing, while the remaining 62% voted for them to protest against war spending and austerity—an attempt at self-defense that was as simplistic as it was illusory.
Indeed, the AfD presented itself as the party most strongly opposed to the war in Ukraine and to drastic welfare cuts—a brazen manipulation of its actual underlying stance, given that it was among the first to endorse the goal of allocating 5% of GDP to military spending; yet, that is how it played out. Elections are a time when tall tales and illusions are peddled most intensely to the public, and it is impossible to beat the far right on that terrain. After all, the AfD’s candidate for minister-president in Saxony-Anhalt, Siegmund, is a professional salesman.
It was a vote against the Merz government (comprising the CDU-CSU and the Social Democrats). As German Foreign Policy wrote: “The result reflects a trend observable in other European countries as well: the population of deindustrialized, impoverished, and structurally disadvantaged regions—devoid of future prospects—is rebelling against the ruling elites. Where a strong, credible left-wing alternative for disadvantaged communities is lacking, they are turning to the right. Examples include Romania, where the far right dominates poor regions outside the capital, Bucharest, and Great Britain, where it has gained a foothold in various impoverished working-class neighborhoods. Now, Saxony-Anhalt is following the same pattern.” The “choice of those with no prospects”…
The AfD’s ideology, platform, and vision
True. But reducing the entire phenomenon to the absence of “a strong, credible left-wing alternative” is misleading. The AfD has been—and remains—capable of attracting both votes and activists through its platform, promises, and worldview; these are key elements of its electoral success. We must, therefore, reckon with them.
Its perspective is ethno-nationalist. For the AfD, society must be reshaped along national and ethnic lines: “thinking German,” promoting a “patriotic political culture,” asserting jus sanguinis (right of blood), “remaking the Germans,” restoring the traditional family and traditional authority, and putting an end to immigration and multiculturalism. It declares war on the “cosmopolitan elites” in Brussels and the European Union—forces it blames for ruining Germany through Schengen, the euro, support for the war in Ukraine, the cutting off of Russian gas and oil supplies, and “permissive” immigration policies. To make Germany—a “failed state” in Weidel’s view—great again, one must turn against its three declared sworn enemies: immigrants, multicultural society, and the EU. Yet, looming not far in the background are “emancipated” women and gender minorities.
The glorification of the traditional German family—comprising a man, a woman, and their children, united by marriage—serves a dual purpose: on one hand, to counter a demographic decline that has persisted for half a century (1.2–1.4 children per native German woman); on the other, to return women to their “natural,” subordinate role vis-à-vis men as mothers and housewives—roles that inevitably require them to shoulder the extra caregiving and support work resulting from drastic welfare cuts. It is no coincidence that 80% of AfD members are male.
At the same time, the party sketches a “model of manhood” that is not merely that of a family head, but of an individual schooled in strength, discipline, the defense of the “national community,” and—if necessary—war. The AfD’s platform includes a return to compulsory military service and emphasizes military—or rather, militarized—values such as “honor, loyalty, camaraderie, and courage,” as well as the need to strengthen esprit de corps and make “soldierly virtues” visible in society once again.
At present, there is no explicit reference to Nazi ideology or the Nazi era. There is merely the shrewd adoption of certain Nazi-era slogans at rallies (without acknowledging their origins) and the trivialization of Nazism—exemplified by the famous remark from AfD patriarch Gauland: “Nazism is nothing more than a bird-shit stain on a thousand years of glorious German history.” Moreover, given the “political nullity” of the proletariat as a revolutionary class, the rise of the AfD and the radical right does not require the initial formation of an armed, anti-worker militia to destroy the class’s organized structures before subsequently reorganizing the scattered, defeated proletarian masses along reactionary lines. Instead, it can appeal to broad sectors of the wage-earning workforce “with a smile” (a trait heavily emphasized in Siegmund), tapping into widespread social discontent and channeling it toward a nationalist, identitarian agenda. It does so by attempting to provide—especially to young people and adolescents—a “reactionary grammar” that does not need to displace a competing, antagonistic worldview, making it particularly dangerous.
As noted, the AfD makes no explicit reference to Nazi ideology or the Nazi experience. Yet, proposals for separate classes—segregating the children of immigrants to remind them that “their stay in Germany is temporary,” and isolating the disabled because they “hinder educational progress”—suggest that, for the party, Nazism serves as a source of inspiration.
The AfD’s political propaganda is a skillful blend of material demands appealing to those facing economic and psychological hardship (public funds should not go to Ukraine, immigrants, or rearmament, but rather to Germans and their well-being); diatribes against global and European elites—accused of humiliating the German nation—and a visionary prospect (“Vision 2026”) of returning to a mythical German world of the past, purified through the expulsion of “intruders” (immigrant populations) and their cultures, and thus rendered peaceful, prosperous, secure, and happy.
It is a nationalist-racist-mythological mix designed to address both the immediate needs of the wage-earning masses—humiliated by two decades of austerity policies that began in 2003–2005 with the devastating Hartz I–IV reforms and were radicalized under the Merz administration—and the dream of an alternative world, free from the long-standing crisis, uncertainty, fears, anxieties, and conflicts of the present day. It would be a mistake to underestimate the far right—and the AfD in particular—and their unique ability to tap into the emotional realm and deep-seated feelings of social groups that have been battered, disoriented, and atomized (especially their male members). They achieve this through spoken rather than written propaganda; through simple, catchy slogans linked to everyday life that are endlessly repeated on modern social media platforms (such as TikTok); and through evocative, spectacular rallies.
Let us be clear: the AfD is entirely bourgeois-capitalist in its class nature. Like its sister parties, it is firmly in the hands of a segment of the bourgeoisie. Both its 2013 inception on moderate grounds (its founders included Hans-Olaf Henkel, former president of the Federation of German Industries) and its subsequent refounding on its current platform were the work of defectors from the CDU or the liberal parties. Capitalism, private ownership of the means of production, the market, profit, and so forth are sacrosanct to the AfD; they do not discuss them because they are beyond question. Nor does the AfD have anything to say about the acute polarization of social wealth—in a Germany with a long-stagnant economy and 20% of the population at risk of poverty, there are now over 200 dollar-billionaires, and the ranks of the super-rich (with assets exceeding $100 million) are also growing. Furthermore, the AfD has taken no stance against the tens of thousands of layoffs announced by Volkswagen, Mercedes, and BMW. In fact, Weidel has spoken of the “explosive wage costs” associated with Volkswagen workers, ruling out any desire to limit the actions of major corporations seeking to “restructure.” In short, it follows the path of economic liberalism: ethno-nationalism combined with free-market liberalism. Trouble and enemies always come from the outside—whether they be the masses or the elites.
And yet, the AfD’s rise is due not only to massive media hype and equally massive “covert” funding, but also to the image it has cultivated: that of a party attuned to the sentiments of the most needy and destabilized segments of the population—some have even dubbed Siegmund the “Robin Hood of the Right,” a label that is, to say the least, highly misleading.
How can this be explained?
The Responsibility of the CDU, SPD, and Union Leadership
This can be explained primarily by the policies pursued over the last 25 years by Germany’s two major post-war parties: the CDU-CSU and the SPD. The assault on the German welfare state was actually launched by the SPD under Gerhard Schröder—a close friend of Putin—through the devastating Hartz I–IV reforms (particularly the latter). Merkel’s governments continued this assault with flanking measures, but first Scholz and now, above all, Merz (in agreement with their SPD partners) have taken up the axe again, making brutal cuts across every sector (1). They did so without any real opposition from the DGB or sectoral trade unions; unsurprisingly, the latter’s actual representativeness has literally collapsed since the 1990s, leaving fewer than 20% of workers unionized today.
The same applies to the warmongering policies that have increasingly characterized all German parliamentary parties—led by the Greens and the hyena Baerbock. This trend began in 2014, the year the post-war era of “military restraint” officially ended at the Munich Security Conference. Today, no EU country can rival Merz’s Germany in the sheer scale of funding for the arms industry (€800 billion!), which is now presented as the cornerstone of the revival of German industry and the economy. Statements made by foreign policy spokesperson Wadephul (CDU) to Bild on September 8th pulled no punches: “We are Ukraine’s leading military and financial backers, and naturally, it is only right that the German arms industry should benefit from this.” And to ensure that aid does not go to waste, his party colleague Söder proposes that the German government send back to Ukraine those draft-eligible men who have emigrated to Germany, thereby prolonging the war. Defense Minister Pistorius (SPD) is no different: he has long advocated for a return to compulsory military service. Meanwhile, the press traditionally close to the Social Democrats—such as Der Spiegel —writes: “We are the daily target of a hybrid war, of Russian aggression (…). Russia is Germany’s enemy. It is a bitter, infinitely sad conclusion,” yet it must be stated “so that everyone can acknowledge the situation we are in.”
Faced with the explicit and rampant resurgence of German militarism—driven by all the major establishment parties and with the consent, rather than opposition, of trade union leaderships—it is child’s play for the AfD to play the role of the “peace party.” It is the only party proposing an end to the unlimited handouts of money to the Zelensky regime and a restoration of gas and oil supplies from Russia, which cost half as much—or perhaps even less—than supplies from the United States.
A similar dynamic is playing out in Italy with General Vannacci’s Futuro Nazionale, which has demagogically dusted off the old anti-militarist slogan “butter, not guns”—coming from none other than the former commander of the Folgore paratroopers! (2).
There has been a great outcry regarding the AfD’s pro-Russian stance, yet its hyper-nationalist platforms contain no indication—let alone proof—of a shift in its position toward Russia. There is merely an acknowledgment that recent governments have harmed German industry and the economy, as well as the living standards of millions of Germans. The rest is far vaguer than Italian newspapers and media—literally obsessed with the shadow of Putin—would have us believe. Admittedly, there is a strong affinity in terms of “foundational values” between the AfD and Putin’s United Russia party, but the affinity with Trump’s MAGA movement is no less significant. Or do figures like Musk and Vance—who were thrilled by the results in Saxony-Anhalt—strike you as naive? In this respect, the future of the AfD’s political trajectory remains to be written, although Germany’s history—and the fact that many of the party’s leaders hail from the CDU and the liberal camp—offer important and unambiguous clues as to the ultimate outcome.
But it is not merely a question of leadership.
However, the broad support the AfD enjoys among the working class and the proletariat cannot be attributed solely to the anti-working-class policies of Social Democratic leaderships or the nationalist corporatism of trade union leaders—factors that have thus far stifled an adequate class-based response.
We must dig deeper. We need to grasp the ideological and psychological legacy of the long decades during which German industry reigned supreme—bringing relative prosperity to what was, and remains, a veritable “labor aristocracy.” Far-right movements, including the AfD, are generally associated with the most downtrodden and fragmented segments of the proletariat; there is truth to this view. However, this requires understanding that their isolation, their sense of abandonment, and at times their despair, are the result of the corporate-minded, sectionalist—and ultimately nationalist—insularity of the workforce at large industrial firms. Mitbestimmung —the shrewd management-Christian Democratic practice of co-management in large enterprises, which secures the subordinate involvement of the best-paid and most securely employed workers in pursuing corporate interests—has kept them apart from any form of struggle waged by the working class as a whole. The multinational and multiracial composition of this core segment of the German proletariat could be a factor of extraordinary importance in the fight against racism and the drive toward war; yet, so far, this potential has been neutralized and defused.
In the mass demonstrations—sizable but not massive—that have taken place since September 6 in Brandenburg, Berlin, Düsseldorf, Hamburg, Leipzig, and Munich, the workforce of large industrial firms has not played a leading role. They still live in a bubble (albeit one that is deflating) without, as yet, reacting forcefully—let alone rebelling—against the detrimental agreements being struck by trade union bureaucracies. This includes the IGMetall, which—just days before the September 21 “day of action” called for the entire crisis-stricken automotive sector—concluded a disastrous deal with Volkswagen to cut 60,000 jobs.
The IGM has confirmed its commitment to the September 21 event; yet, while it claims that “cohesion [among workers] is our greatest source of strength,” it fully accepts the employers’ goal of “greater competitiveness”—arguing only that this should be achieved through innovation and investment rather than austerity. It is the same old tune from those who want to teach capitalists how to be capitalists. It is also a way to shatter the much-vaunted “cohesion” among workers, given that the competitiveness accepted by the IGM as a guiding principle is, in fact, competition between German firms and between plants within the same corporate group.
However, this long-standing practice of class collaboration between exploiters and the exploited—which was only briefly disrupted in Germany during the early 1970s by the immigrant working class—is now on borrowed time. Proof of this lies in the surging tide of militarism and the determination with which German industry (Confindustria) ordered Merz—following the defeat in Saxony-Anhalt—not to back down from his “reform plan” and to “see it through to the end,” regardless of his re-election prospects. At stake, beyond mass layoffs, are devastating wage cuts, longer working hours, and the intensification of labor, alongside the most severe attack on welfare benefits in history.
The industrial proletariat will be forced to shake off its political stupor. The harsh reality of the facts will demonstrate that the “minimum effort” approach—prioritizing compromise at any cost—does not pay off. Yet, blows struck by class enemies (the Merz government, corporate management, the AfD) will not be enough to restore the working class to a leading role on the political stage; It will require relentless political work by revolutionary vanguards to steer it back onto the class-based path it lost a century ago under the savage blows of Nazism (and other forces). In the immediate term—to begin with—the task is to avoid the trap of “anti-fascist fronts” alongside the democratic and social-democratic forces that facilitated the AfD’s rise and now clamor, with varying degrees of hypocrisy, against the AfD’s agenda.
It will not be the CDU or the SPD that stop the AfD.
The cries of alarm—admittedly not very shrill—from the governing parties that threw the doors open to the AfD’s success seem aimed primarily at threatening the working-class electorate, and immigrant populations above all: “Watch out, there could be something worse than a Merz government, or the CDU and SPD!” It is no coincidence that the keyword deployed—even in Italy—by mass media aligned with the “broad progressive camp” is fear. If not out of gratitude or conviction, then vote for us, stay with us, rally to us out of fear of something worse—that very “worse” outcome which is advancing precisely because of the anti-proletarian and warmongering policies of the CDU and SPD.
After all, the reason financial circles have been inflating the far right (for twenty years now) is precisely this: to generate fear and division within the working class along lines of nationality, “race,” and gender, diverting mounting social discontent into devastating “identity-based” conflicts within the class itself. They are by no means abandoning their traditional parties, but—for the dramatic times ahead—they are bringing new cards into play. (3)
It is no coincidence that the mainstream press—whose profession entails denying or concealing social classes and class antagonisms—has suddenly rediscovered the working class, only to cast them as the true, decisive backers of the AfD and similar parties. “It is the workers who are sending racist parties skyrocketing like missiles!”—this is the cunning mantra used to amplify confusion within a class genuinely fearful for its future. We owe thanks to cryptocurrency capitalists Ben Delo and Christofer Harbone for publicly admitting: “We gave Farage an outright donation of 36 plus 36—that is, 72 million pounds (83 million euros)—for his election campaign.” Perhaps they did so to prevent the scoundrel they were bankrolling—a notorious crook—from pocketing the entire sum as a personal windfall. The fact remains that behind the sudden, dizzying rise—media-driven before it was political—of these groups lie significant capital investments, certainly not from working-class sources. Working-class support—whether passive or active, limited or widespread—follows only as a subordinate element.
As for the proposal—touted in some quarters—to create a *cordon sanitaire* of all democratic parties to halt the AfD, it collapsed before it could even materialize. Voices within the CDU are increasingly calling for dialogue with the AfD, given the substantial common ground of racist nationalism and traditionalism they share. The idea also failed due to the pro-AfD stance taken by Sahra Wagenknecht—a figure who has played a disastrous role in the degeneration of German social democracy and the institutional Left; we have already said what is essential about her, and it is not worth revisiting the matter here (4). Ultimately, the (supposedly) strong argument that democrats in the mold of von der Leyen and Prodi counterpose to the advance of the AfD and the far right is: we need more Europe! A more powerful, determined, and united Europe as an antidote to nationalism. Yet this is an imperialistic super-nationalism that fuels—rather than counteracts—individual nationalisms. Moreover, with its increasingly repressive, restrictive, and selective migration policies—which have recently effectively abolished the right to asylum and introduced mandatory deportation—it follows the same path as the AfD. The relentless Russophobic campaign yields the same result (regardless of the current ambiguities in the AfD leadership’s stance on the matter). In both cases, the democratic message is: “Beware the enemy coming from outside—or standing outside—our borders!” Do you detect any fundamental difference between this and the AfD’s message?
A separate question is whether the program of making Germany great again—as demanded by its “glorious 1,000-year history”—will lead to the EU’s fragmentation due to a series of uncontrollable counter-reactions, or whether it will allow a Germany—now more assertive and aggressive than ever—to impose its primacy on other European powers (as the Nazis dreamed of doing, succeeding for only a fleeting moment). We shall discuss that another time. Here, having ruled out the possibility that Germany’s internal democratic forces or the EU leadership might halt the AfD’s rise, we wish to focus on the central political question for us:
How can the AfD be stopped?
The only force capable of stopping the AfD is a major movement of struggle by the proletariat—industrial and otherwise—against the Merz government; against policies of “austerity” (i.e., mass impoverishment), layoffs, and the drive toward rearmament and war; against the state racism plaguing immigrant populations—whether in its “moderate” form or its extreme version (“we will expel all immigrants from the very first minute of the very first day,” as Siegmund put it); and against the machismo that seeks to put women back “in their place,” in accordance with the dictates of “nature.”
One might object: where is such a force to be found today?
It has yet to emerge—there is no doubt about that, and we do not delude ourselves on this point. It is no coincidence that we have repeatedly spoken of a rebirth of the class-based proletarian movement, rather than a mere reorganization—particularly regarding Western Europe. In Germany, as in Italy, revolutionaries operate today in a context where there is no longer any trace or memory of revolutionary class actions, nor of a working-class existence that stands separate from and opposed to the capitalist order. Even the turbulent 1970s—a time when the class consciousness of the most militant proletarians was far more advanced—failed to reverse this trend. Subsequently, reformist (PCI) and social-democratic (SPD) parties succeeded in framing the widespread perception of the working class as a distinct social entity in increasingly nationalistic and company-centric terms. Through this process—fueled by the illusion of a gradual ascent into paradise—the very consciousness of being a distinct entity began to dissolve.
We are therefore fully aware that here in Europe—starting with Germany itself—we must rebuild from the lowest point the proletarian movement has reached in its two-century history. When we speak of necessity, we do not underestimate the enormous difficulties that lie ahead. The ethno-nationalism, racism, Islamophobia, and machismo characterizing the AfD’s platform—and even the acceptance of war as an inevitable historical fact—are by no means alien to the German, or indeed the European, proletariat of today. Hannah Arendt recognized that in the Germany of the 1920s and 1930s, only the German working class stood as a bulwark against racism and antisemitism. Unfortunately, we cannot say the same today. Yet, at the same time, it is only from this “side”—the non-exploiting segment of society—that the strength to oppose both the AfD and the rampant militarism of the German bourgeoisie as a whole can emerge, albeit through immense upheavals and clashes. The looming specters of war and ecological catastrophe hang over the working masses, generating—thus far—a prevailing sense of powerlessness. However, the developments awaiting us will impact the lives of those who live by their labor with increasing violence, compelling them to react.
This conviction drives us to seek out—however modest they may be—signs of a reaction against the advance of the AfD and the militarism of a Merz-led government, which represents the other side of the coin of capital’s agenda. At present, these signs remain scattered and relatively weak, particularly in terms of their political substance. The protests against the AfD that erupted spontaneously in sixteen cities over the election weekend (including Magdeburg and Halle in Saxony-Anhalt), drawing tens of thousands of participants, alongside the equally large-scale demonstrations on September 13 (notably in Hamburg and Düsseldorf), indicate that the danger has been recognized. These were public gatherings where, significantly, women had a strong presence. However—as far as we can tell—these initial responses have been characterized by a tone that is neither militant nor well-organized, and which lacks a clear awareness of what is truly at stake.
Yet, the dynamics and timing of class conflict are always difficult to predict. We have said: keep a close eye on September 21 and 26! These will be days of mobilization where the idea of a class-based response to the rise of the AfD—independent of the maneuvers of the bourgeois parties in power—could gain some ground.
In the coming months and years, the need for such a response will become increasingly urgent, as the only way the bourgeois governing forces can counter the AfD’s successes is by adopting its policies—albeit perhaps in a more moderate form. After all, wasn’t it precisely this approach that allowed the Social Democracy of Ms. Andersson and her “left-wing” allies to narrowly prevail in the Swedish elections?
For the proletarian movement and the youth forces that have begun mobilizing in schools over recent months against the reintroduction of mandatory conscription, rediscovering confidence in the struggle is crucial. Struggling fosters confidence in the struggle. Moreover, class struggle is the only terrain upon which one can prevent the clash between German proletarians and immigrants—a conflict the AfD seeks to stoke at all costs—and instead achieve unity against common enemies: the class of exploiters, their governments, and their henchmen like Weidel and Siegmund.
It is not an impossible mission. After all, where does the vile rhetoric of “remigration” find the least traction? In large cities where social and personal ties between native and immigrant populations have been strong and well-established for decades—starting in workplaces and schools (with Hamburg, Berlin, and Bremen leading the way). Few have noted this, but Saxony-Anhalt is one of the areas in Germany with the lowest levels of immigration; there, many “see” immigrants primarily through the lens of propaganda and state policy. This means that a web of relationships has developed in Germany—where people with a “migration background” now make up 33% of the population—that offers silent resistance to the large-scale ethnic cleansing promised by AfD impostors as the cure-all for every social ill. One of their leaders, Chrupalla, has already had to scale back the scope of “remigration,” limiting it to immigrants with criminal records and those who have received deportation orders, stating: “Those who work here, pay taxes, and integrate into the community are welcome. We make no distinction between Germans with and without a migration history. It is in everyone’s interest for Germany to be a prosperous and safe country” (interview with la Repubblica, September 11).
Germany’s prosperity stems—to a degree unmatched by any other European country—precisely from the labor and sacrifices of tens of millions of immigrant proletarians. And it will be hard—very hard—for them to overturn this reality, despite the backing of the “lie machine.” This is especially true because the polarization of social wealth and the drive toward war will not spare even the “native” German proletariat—to the extent that it still exists—in the coming years.
Nor do we believe it will be easy to force German women to swallow a disciplined, subordinate “return to the home”—or any form of male-female relationship that is even semi-patriarchal—particularly given that, for the first time in Europe (specifically in East Germany), the female employment rate has surpassed the male rate.
Countering and dismantling the AfD’s racist, militaristic, and sexist propaganda and demagoguery is possible only within the—indispensable—context of a resurgence in class and social conflict. From this struggle must also emerge the need for forms of militant self-defense against the violence of anti-immigrant gangs—both private and state-sponsored— to which paved the way the rise of the AfD, an admirer of Trump’s ICE.
Determined class vanguards will therefore have plenty of work to do—both on the political-ideological front and in terms of immediate material and economic defense—to become the natural focal point for social discontent. Yet it will be equally crucial not to cede the terrain of “vision”—of the “ideal” future for which we fight—to the far right. That future is a society of free and equal individuals, where the exploitation of human beings by other human beings and of nature is abolished; where the risk of poverty is eradicated; and where war no longer exists because its root cause—private ownership of the wealth produced by collective, associated labor—has been eliminated.
In a world where nightmares are multiplying, revolutionaries must no longer shy away from proclaiming and pursuing their “dream” of overthrowing the capitalist socio-economic and political order. A new world is not merely possible; it is necessary. And it is more urgent than ever to set about building it.
As the great Rosa —the Polish-born German revolutionary—foresaw: socialism—an anti-capitalist social revolution—or barbarism! There is no third way.
Notes
(2) It is worth noting that, recently in Umbria, *Futuro Nazionale* even attempted to intervene in a labor dispute involving the company Dussmann—a situation in which the CUB union was already involved—
https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1Busi11S3y
3) This was evident in Italy at the recent Cernobbio business forum: Vannacci was invited to significantly boost his political weight, yet the loudest applause went to the old guard figure Monti, who challenged him. On the surface, it was Monti versus Vannacci; beneath the surface, however, it was Monti (the old guard of the bourgeoisie) and Vannacci (a potential backup option).
(4) https://pungolorosso.com/2025/02/20/sahra-wagenknecht-e-i-suoi-spasimanti-tricolore/