Foreword

At a historical juncture such as the present, marked by an ever-accelerating race toward rearmament
and a new global inter-capitalist war, for those of us who live and work in Italy — a country that is
an integral part, and by no means a minor one, of NATO, the EU, and other institutions of the
Western imperialist camp — it is of fundamental importance to categorically establish that our
primary enemy is here, “in our home country”: “our” government, “our” capitalism — which has long
since reached the imperialist stage —, “our” state, and the alliances of which it is a member.

But it is equally important to gain a clear understanding of the nature and characteristics of the
camp opposed to the West, and in particular of the nature of China’s socioeconomic formation and
its state.

In a previous article, we demonstrated that today’s China is, according to Marxist analytical criteria,
a fully capitalist country; and that in the face of the real social relations existing there, the CCP’s
ideological mystifications do not hold up. At the heart of today’s Chinese economic and social
structure lies, indeed, the buying and selling of the commodity “labor power” in a labor market
dominated by private and state capital.

https://pungolorosso.com/2024/08/10/todays-china-dna-capitalism-or-what-else-i/

With this article, we take a further step toward answering the question: Has China reached the
imperialist stage of capitalism, or not? Here too, our answer — which is: yes, China has reached
imperialist maturity — is based on the Marxist criteria of analysis as outlined by Lenin in its
Imperialism. And it has specific political consequences. Because it characterizes the bloc of powers
and countries that China is striving to bring together as a leader — not as a bloc fighting against the
Western camp to free us from imperialist capitalism, but to contend with the
United States and Western imperialist powers for dominance over the world market.

Far from being a factor for peace, China’s meteoric rise as a great power at full imperialist maturity
is one of the main factors in the intensification of the struggle for a new division of the world into
spheres of influence — a struggle that is driving generalized rearmament, new regional wars, and
toward a new world war.

Those on the “left” who deny China’s imperialist maturation and describe today’s China as a
“socialist” country — in whole or in part, even if it is “market socialism” (!?) and “with Chinese
characteristics” — in any case, as a new economic and social model to be emulated, and even as a
bulwark against imperialism—are in reality aligning themselves with a bloc of forces China is
working to bring together, which is just as capitalist and imperialist. And they are — whether
aware of it or not (perhaps many are not) — for a new apocalyptic global inter-capitalist war, not
against it, in the delusional hope that the West will lose it and that the West’s eventual defeat
might — on the vast wasteland of a globalized Gaza — open the doors to a “better world.”

We, on the contrary, are strenuously against the arms race, first and foremost against the
rearmament of Italy and the EU; vehemently against this increasingly openly called for — and
planned — showdown between the great powers of capital, because it would be a catastrophe of
unimaginable proportions for the working masses of the entire world, for humanity in general, and for the natural environment, all of which would pay its monstrous costs — whichever side
ultimately prevails.

In view of this epochal clash brought about by the implosion of the capitalist system, consistent
proletarian internationalism appeals not to the capitalist states that are enemies of “ours,” but to
the proletariat of these countries, to the international camp of the exploited and oppressed all over the world, so that in this exceptional historical juncture that has opened up, we refuse to cut each other’s
throats, and we unite in the common struggle for the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, of any form of capitalism, for socialism.

***

Our assessment is that Chinese capitalism (a mixture of state-owned and private ownership of the means of production, held together by strong state interventionism) has reached imperialist maturity, and given its size, is objectively the United States’ main contender for global supremacy. This leads to the formation of a “camp” of countries and states led by China, which stands in opposition to the camp led by the United States (in whose shadow European imperialist powers have so far flourished).

In this article, which is a reworking of a presentation given at a TIR study session, we refer to Lenin’s definition of capitalist imperialism. When he points to the “five basic features of imperialism,” Lenin is referring to the world system that has taken on the characteristics of imperialism, rather than to the specific characteristics that make a country “imperialist.” In other words, it is the global capitalist system that has developed the “five features” by reaching its imperialist phase—which Lenin views as the “supreme stage” of the capitalist mode of production—where six great powers divide up the world—with war and the massacre of tens of millions of people underway as he writes.

To put it as succinctly as possible, Lenin writes: “Imperialism is the monopolistic stage of capitalism.” Drawing a parallel with biology, a simply capitalist country and an imperialist country do not represent two different species; they are two “stages” in the evolution of the same species: the stage of “free competition” among many producers and that of monopolies controlling the market. Free competition in the market leads to concentration and monopoly. What both stages have in common is that they are based on the exploitation of wage labor. Monopolies look far ahead, toward the exploitation of the proletariat even in other territories.

1. Concentration of Capital and Monopolies

The first feature identified by Lenin is “the concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life.” Where does China stand in terms of the concentration of production and capital?

Among the world’s top 500 companies by revenue in 2024 (Fortune ranking)

– 138 were American (the result of 150 years of accumulation, beginning with the robber barons and continuing through two world wars and the seignorage of the dollar, which led the U.S. to global supremacy);

– 124 were Chinese (the result of 40–50 years of accumulation since the launch of the free-market policy);

– Only by combining the next four countries in the ranking—the major Japanese (40), German (39), French (28), and British (17) conglomerates—do we reach China’s total.

– China is hot on the heels of the U.S. not only in terms of the number of large monopolistic conglomerates but also in terms of their overall size: the revenue of U.S. companies in the ranking (for the year 2023) was 12.4 trillion dollars, compared to 10.1 trillion for Chinese companies (equivalent to about four times Italy’s GDP);

– Chinese companies surpass American ones in terms of assets (49.9 trillion dollars versus 41.3 trillion dollars) and in terms of the number of employees (22.3 million for China versus 20.1 million for American companies). Both figures are certainly underestimated, as they do not include outsourced workers, but in any case, the 128 large Chinese companies directly employed a number of workers equal to the entire Italian workforce. The average size of the 128 Chinese companies in the 2023 ranking was a staggering 174,000 employees—a scale unheard of in Italy, where the group with the most employees, Poste Italiane, had 124,000 employees.

These figures confirm that the concentration of production and capital in China has already reached American levels. This was made possible by the creation of a true national market (of 1.4 billion people…), through the most massive construction of transportation (railways and highways), energy, and telecommunications infrastructure the world has ever seen—carried out in just a few decades—and in comparison to which the railway construction in the United States at the end of the 19th century, which gave impetus to American capitalism, dwarfs.

China’s high-speed rail network, spanning 50,000 km, accounts for two-thirds of the world’s high-speed rail lines. In just a few decades, China has transitioned from a collection of local, province-level economies to a single national market, which has enabled local businesses to consolidate into leading national companies (with monopolistic market power) across various sectors. This has also led to enormous economies of scale and the rapid development of world-class technologies that are competitive on the global market. The transition from being a producer and exporter of consumer goods in the apparel sector to becoming the leading producer and exporter in nearly all industrial sectors (with exports of medium-to-high-tech products equal to or exceeding those of the U.S. and Europe) occurred with surprising speed, thanks in part to the adoption, during the first two decades of the current century, of technologies developed in the U.S., Europe, and Japan by their major corporations seeking to conquer the Chinese market. Having assimilated state-of-the-art technology in most sectors, Chinese companies—which have access to the world’s largest pool of technicians and engineers (3.5 million STEM graduates annually, compared to 820,000 in the U.S.)—have often moved to the forefront and now dominate most industrial sectors. From the table taken from the UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) *International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics 2025*, we can see that, out of 23 manufacturing sectors:

– in 2000, China ranked first among producing countries in 4 sectors: textiles, apparel, leather, and electronics (here, production of lower-value components and assembly of the finished product), the U.S. in 17 sectors, and Japan in 1 (automotive)

In 2023, China ranked first in 20 sectors, the U.S. in 3 (paper, coke, and aircraft), while it ranked second in 16 sectors. Japan, which ranked second in 13 sectors in 2000, now ranks only third in 8 sectors.

In 20 years, China has turned the tables in its relations with the U.S. and other major powers. Chinese companies hold a dominant position (using as a benchmark three times the market share of the second-ranked country) not only in textiles, apparel, leather, and electronics, but also in non-metallic minerals (including rare earths), base metals (48.8% of global production compared to 7.7% for the United States), computers and electronics (42% versus 11%), in electrical machinery (58.7% versus 8.6% for the U.S.), and in machinery (38% versus 10%), while in the automotive sector, its production is 2.5 times that of the U.S. (32.2% versus 13%).

It is clear from these figures that Chinese companies have gained global market power in numerous sectors, developing their own brands that now set new global standards (think of solar panels, but also electric cars). Huawei, Xiaomi, Haier, Midea, Hisense, BYD… China is no longer just an assembly line for Apple’s iPhones.

This also holds true for the strategic sector of raw materials, where China dominates the extraction and, above all, the refining of many strategic minerals:

China’s share of global refining capacity:

Copper 45%

Lithium 68%

Cobalt 77%

Graphite 94%

Rare earths 92%

Manganese 91%

Restricting exports of these materials constitutes a powerful political lever, used against Trump’s super-tariffs, forcing him to back down if he did not want leading American companies in electronics, AI, and the military to be left without the materials essential for production. This market power also allows Chinese monopolies to impose prices that guarantee them superprofits. This is also the case for a range of industrial products:

China’s share of global production of

Solar panels >80%

Electric cars >50%

Steel >50%

Shipbuilding 55%

In this latter sector—which is strategic because it carries a large portion of global trade but also includes the construction of military ships—China held 63.7% of global orders as of early 2025. South Korea ranks second with 28% of production, followed by Japan in third place with 17%. Other countries get the crumbs (Italy 0.64%, U.S. 0.04%). In a naval arms race, there’s no contest between the U.S. and China.

As to nuclear power plants, China is building 34 of the 62 plants currently under construction worldwide.

Of course, China is not yet dominant in certain cutting-edge technologies such as chips for artificial intelligence, but we can say with reasonable certainty that it is only a matter of time, given the huge research apparatus and the government’s centralization of scientific efforts in these sectors.

With regard to the first feature of imperialism identified by Lenin—the concentration of production and capital— we can therefore state without a shadow of a doubt that not only does China meet this criterion, but it also ranks first in the world in terms of the strength of its industrial groups, whose total output is nearly double that of the United States (4.66 trillion dollars in 2023 compared to 2.5 trillion in the U.S.), and a concentration of capital comparable to that of the United States. This conclusion stems from an overall assessment of the comprehensive data on China’s productive structure, rather than from individual examples, which can be found to support any thesis.

2. Financial Capital

The second feature of imperialism, according to Lenin, is “the merging of bank capital with industrial capital and the creation, on the basis of this ‘finance capital,’ of a financial oligarchy.” In the 110 years since Lenin’s essay on imperialism, the financialization of the economy has undergone further enormous developments; banks have been joined by other financial operators such as investment funds and other “financial vehicles,” while the stock market—which Lenin, observing Germany in particular, saw as in “decline” under the dominance of the big banks—has in fact maintained an important role in the centralization of capital over the subsequent century, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, by making savings available to large corporations and accelerating the pace of their concentration.

Indeed, in just a few decades, China has surpassed the United States in terms of banking strength and is also closing in on it in terms of stock market capitalization.

Among the world’s top 100 banks by assets in 2025, China accounted for 23, representing 35% of total assets, followed by the United States with 11 banks and 14.2% of assets. The financing of Chinese—as well as foreign—companies through domestic savings is a powerful driver of industrial concentration, which has enabled Chinese firms to achieve extremely high investment rates (around 40% of GDP, roughly double those of the old powers).

The world’s 100 largest banks, by country
	N. of banks	Assets ($ bn)	% of total assets
China	23	46577	35,1
USA	11	18837	14,2
France	6	12522	9,4
Japan	8	9989	7,5
UK	6	8950	6,8
Canada	6	6712	5,1
Spain	3	4037	3,0
Germany	4	3562	2,7
Sud Korea	5	2662	2,0
Italy	2	2149	1,6
Switzerland	2	2025	1,5
Brazil	4	1830	1,4
India	2	1547	1,2
Russia	2	1336	1,0
Netherlands	2	1261	1,0
Source. Our analysis on data in S&P Global Market Intelligence report, April 2026

The world’s top four banks are all Chinese: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and Bank of China. Their strength—and that of the other 19 banks among the world’s top 100—is such that they can provide loans to support the overseas expansion of the companies with which they are linked.

The widespread notion that Chinese capitalism is strong in industry but not in finance is therefore wholly unfounded, even though the expansion of Chinese banks abroad is still in its early stages.

China is also climbing the rankings toward the top positions in the stock markets. The United States is clearly in the lead here, with a market capitalization of 36 trillion dollars for the Nasdaq and 31 trillion for the New York Stock Exchange: 67 trillion in total, twice the U.S. gross domestic product (only time will tell how much of this figure is a bubble).

But China is second, with the Shanghai Stock Exchange third at 10.2 trillion dollars (T$), Shenzhen sixth at 7.3 T$, and Hong Kong seventh at 6.2 T$ in market capitalization, for a total of 23.7 T$—equal to the total of the major European stock exchanges, including London, and Tokyo combined. The massive extraction of surplus value by Chinese capitalism from 700 million proletarians translates into a vast mass of profits and dividends, which attracts massive amounts of capital from China and around the world, driving up stock prices. This is strengthening the class of big Chinese capitalists—what Lenin calls the “financial oligarchy.”

In this ranking as well, China ranks second behind the United States with over 600 billionaires (followed by India, which ranks ahead of Germany and has four times as many billionaires as Great Britain, its former colonial power, while Italy, with its family-run capitalism, ranks sixth, ahead of the other European countries and Japan).

N. of billionaires in US$, 2025
1	USA	989
2	China+Hong Kong	610
3	India	229
4	Germany	212
5	Russia	149
6	Italy	90
7	Canada	82
8	Brazil	70
9	UK	57
10	France	53
11	South Corea	50
12	Japan	45
13	Israel	41
14	Spain	39
15	Indonesia	35
16	Mexico	24

According to the Chinese Hurun Rich List, in 2025 there were 1,021 Chinese individuals or households with a net worth of $1 billion or more. At the top of the list are the owners of TikTok, Tencent, CATL (batteries), Xiaomi, Midea (home appliances), Geely and BYD (automobiles), Alibaba (e-commerce), and companies in other sectors such as beverages, large-scale pig farming, Bitcoins, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, drones, online delivery networks, and so on. China’s financial oligarchy tends to mirror that of the United States.

This is a “financial oligarchy” that exercises the power of money by appropriating the product of the labor of millions of workers; its members strike deals and clash with one another, using the state apparatus to extend the scope of their dominance on an international scale. Possessing or controlling $1 billion in capital means having the “right” to appropriate the labor of tens of thousands of wage earners, whether in China or abroad. It is not merely “wealth” that enables a lavish lifestyle; it is social power. A social power that, in the United States, is openly expressed through lobbying activities to influence government decisions in favor of their own interests—by supporting one candidate over another—while in China, billionaires and millionaires advance their interests within the Party to secure measures that benefit them.

Even in terms of the formation of financial capital and a “financial oligarchy,” China has thus developed all the characteristics of the imperialist stage of capitalism. These characteristics drive its capital to seek outlets abroad and to enter with ever-greater force into the division of the world market and the globe’s resources.

3. The export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance

China has been the world’s leading exporter of goods for years. In 2025, its exports totaled $3,772 billion dollars, followed by the EU bloc with 2,985 $bn and the U.S. with 2,185 bn. China’s industrial and agricultural production has grown enormously, exceeding the size of its already massive domestic market of 1.4 billion people and creating a growing trade surplus, which reached nearly 1,200 billion in 2025 (992 in 2024)—in contrast to the U.S. trade deficit of $1,320 bn. If we add the U.S. surplus and the Chinese deficit in trade in services, we have a U.S. trade deficit of approximately $1,000 bn, compared to a Chinese surplus of approximately $ 1,100 bn.

It is worth noting that despite the U.S. protectionist offensive, the volume of Chinese exports in 2025 grew by 9.2%, compared with a 5.5% increase in value, because Chinese companies reduced their export prices. Direct exports from China to the U.S. fell by 20%, and those to Russia by 10.4%, but exports to Southeast Asia, India, Africa (+25.8%), and South America saw double-digit growth; exports to Europe also rose by 8.4%. Overall: exports to the U.S. decreased by $105 bn, while exports to the rest of the world—especially to low- and middle-income countries—increased by 301 billion…

As shown in the chart from the WTO’s *Global Trade Outlook and Statistics* bulletin, March 2026, a clear “decoupling” is underway between China and the U.S., with bilateral trade having halved and the U.S. trade deficit standing at approximately $1,000 bn. This way, China accumulates foreign currency with which to make investments abroad, while the U.S., to pay for imports, must increasingly print dollars, which exporters can use to purchase assets in the United States.

The export of capital is a fundamental characteristic of the imperialist phase of capitalism compared to the export of goods because, through it, companies not only capture shares of foreign markets but also establish themselves in those territories with their own production facilities and take control of the local workforce and local resources (agricultural, minerals).

China has quickly gone from being a net importer to a net exporter of capital in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI). From a minimal level in 2000 (less than $200 bn), the stock of FDI in China has risen to second place in the world behind the U.S., with over $3,600 bn: U.S., European, and Japanese capital invested in joint ventures with Chinese companies and in factories equipped with the latest technologies to penetrate the Chinese market. Volkswagen, for example, has sold more cars in China than in Germany for several years, and even today China remains its second-largest market, where it sold 2.9 million vehicles in 2024—most of which were produced at the group’s 18 Chinese subsidiaries. The condition imposed by the Chinese government on foreign companies to gain access to its market was the transfer of technology. In a short time, Chinese companies have thus surpassed their Western partners in production technologies and products (for example, electric cars, where Chinese manufacturers now account for more than half of global production).

Over the past 15 years, Chinese companies have significantly increased their foreign direct investment, with three main objectives: 1) to utilize labor at a lower cost than in China (e.g., Southeast Asia) for production primarily intended for export; 2) to enter local markets, thereby circumventing any protectionist barriers (in the U.S., Mexico, and Europe); 3) to gain control over the raw materials necessary for their own industry. According to data from the UN agency UNCTAD, in 2024 China, with a stock of $3,118 bn in foreign direct investment, ranked third in the world, nearly on par with the Netherlands (home to numerous multinational corporations), and ahead of Canada, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, France (Hong Kong, which invests primarily in China, and the Virgin Islands, a tax haven, cannot be included in China’s total). It is worth noting the exponential pace of growth in Chinese FDI, which increased tenfold from 2010 to 2024, while U.S. FDI merely doubled and that of the Netherlands grew by “only” 50%.

Outward FDI stock, by country (in miliardi di US$)
Investor country	2010	2024
United States	4810	9758
Netherlands	2192	3183
China	317	3118
Canada	998	2793
Great Britain	1686	2285
Germany	1365	2252
Hong Kong	944	2216
Japan	831	2151
France	1173	1679
Switzerland	1043	1287
South Korea	144	763
Spain	653	632
Italy	491	609
Taiwan	191	532
Brazil	149	360
India	97	260
Russia	336	230
Arabia (Saudi)	27	229
Mexico	120	207

Source: Our analysis of UNCTAD data

Outbound Chinese FDI reached its peak in 2016–17, then declined—though remaining at high levels—due to two factors: increased caution following numerous cases of problematic investments, and growing scrutiny in the U.S., Europe, and other countries aimed at preventing Chinese companies from gaining control of strategic assets.

The main destination countries for Chinese investment are: the United States (200.7 billion over more than 20 years, according to calculations by the American Enterprise Institute, which, however, considers only investments above the 95 million threshold); in addition to manufacturing facilities, there are many investments in real estate and services. Next come Australia, with $106.8 bn, primarily due to its resources and companies in the mining sector, and the United Kingdom ($104.7 bn according to the AEI; £134 bn, equivalent to $174 bn according to the Sunday Times, which also includes smaller investments): among the most significant investments: a 33.5% stake in the Hinkley Point Nuclear Power Station, controlled by the French company EDF; 49% of HSBC, the leading British bank and eighth-largest in the world; and stakes in AstraZeneca (pharmaceuticals), BP, Shell, and Diageo (alcohol); Chinese companies own 17 private schools, three soccer clubs including Manchester City, Odeon UCI Cinemas and Cineworld, QHotels and Skyscanner, 10% of Heathrow Airport, 49% of Neptune Energy, 9% of Thames Water, and 90% of Logicor. In fourth place is Brazil, with a total of $72.6 (sobnurce: AEI), but in 2025, Brazil was the top destination for Chinese investment, with $6.1 billion; investments in the electric power sector ranked first, followed by the mining sector, which tripled to $1.76 bn. Other investment sectors include oil (China’s CNPC, in partnership with the U.S.-based Chevron, acquired nine offshore exploration blocks off the mouth of the Amazon River). Additionally, China’s BYD opened its first electric vehicle manufacturing plant in Camaçari (Bahia), Brazil, capturing 90% of the local market. U.S. investment in Brazil remains significantly larger than Chinese investment, which has nonetheless grown strongly and is linked to the fact that China has been Brazil’s leading trading partner since 2009. Following Brazil, the main destinations of Chinese direct investment are Switzerland, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Singapore, and France, driven by a combination of economic opportunities and strategic expansion. It is worth noting that the share of foreign direct investment made by non-state-owned enterprises rose from 30% of the total in 2014 to 55% in 2024.

These investments turn Chinese enterprises—both state-owned and private—into “employers” (extractors of profits and superprofits, as the case may be) that employ the labor force of the host countries. According to China Daily, by the end of 2023 there were 48,000 Chinese companies abroad, with revenue of 3.5 trillion dollars (far more than Italy’s GDP) and 4.3 million direct employees—which suggests there is a much larger number of employees working through subcontracting or temporary agencies. Assuming a (low) profit margin of 5%, this would amount to $175 billion per year in profits generated by overseas operations.

Another form that Chinese capital exports take is loans abroad. China has become the leading creditor nation for outstanding international loans, with $2,100 bn. These loans often finance projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for the construction of infrastructure—including roads, railways, ports, dams, power plants, etc.—totaling more than $1 trillion. In addition to the repayment of principal, these loans generally require the payment of interest (which, according to E. Touissaint, is typically lower than that charged by international institutions and Western banks); however, in many cases, the loan is repaid by granting the right to operate the infrastructure for 20–99 years (with the right to collect highway tolls, rail fares, etc.). In quite a few cases, Chinese loans—like those managed by the IMF and the Paris Club—have pushed indebted countries to the brink of bankruptcy, leading to talk of the use of the “debt trap” to manipulate the governments of poor, indebted countries to the creditor’s advantage. In any case, Chinese loans are also capital seeking profit—which inevitably forms part of the surplus value extracted from the labor of local workers—and are aimed at exerting economic and political influence, certainly not charity.

Two examples among many: the president of Tanzania, John Magufuli, called the loan agreements linked to New Silk Road projects “exploitative and embarrassing,” and stated that Chinese lenders had imposed “conditions so harsh that only fools could accept them,” since his government had been asked to provide a 33-year guarantee and a 99-year lease for the construction of a port (a timeframe taken directly from the old colonial era). Magufuli stated that the Chinese contractors wanted to take ownership of the land, but that his government had to compensate them for the drilling work necessary to carry out the project [source: The Economist, December 18, 2020]. In May 2021, the president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Félix Tshisekedi, called for a review of the mining contracts signed with China by his predecessor, Joseph Kabila, particularly Sicomines’ multimillion-dollar “minerals-for-infrastructure” agreement.

Linked to the “Belt and Road Initiative”—through which China has expanded its economic and political sphere of influence over the past 13 years—and often to loans from Chinese banks, are the major infrastructure construction projects. The map showing the top countries receiving foreign construction projects from Chinese companies between 2005 and 2024 is of interest.

Main destinations of China’s contruction projects ($bn)
Saudi Arabia	56,3
Pakistan	52,3
EAU (Emirates)	38,5
Indonesia	32,8
Algeria	30,8
Australia	30,6
Nigeria	30,0
Malaysia	29,7
Angola	28,4
Bangladesh	26,2

These major projects involve close ties with governments, and their geopolitical distribution is indicative of Chinese influence. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates rank at the top (projects in exchange for oil), along with Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Bangladesh in Asia, and Algeria, Nigeria, and Angola—three oil-producing countries—in Africa.

4. China in Africa: Development and Dependence

In Imperialism, Lenin states that, while on the one hand “The export of capital is made possible by a number of backward countries having already been drawn into world capitalist intercourse” (after more than a century, ALL countries have been drawn into world capitalist intercours), on the other hand, “The export of capital influences and greatly accelerates the development of capitalism in those countries to which it is exported.” This applies to all capital investments, regardless of the investors’ intentions, in the sense that it tends to expand wage labor and the market while reducing pre-capitalist self-consumption. It is true, however, that the colonial powers implemented extractivist policies, plundering mineral and agricultural resources, and building only the bare minimum of infrastructure necessary for their transport. Now, the independent former colonies are seeking to build the communication and transportation infrastructure needed to connect local economies into a national market, and to link their national markets with those of neighboring—often unconnected—countries, as well as with the global market.

The Belt and Road Initiative aims to connect the countries of Asia and Africa—and Europe—to China to boost trade, but it also addresses these needs of emerging capitalist economies, while simultaneously increasing China’s political influence in competition with the old colonial powers. The approach, however, remains fundamentally capitalist, with the imperialist characteristics we have been describing. To get down to specifics, let’s examine some aspects of China’s penetration into Africa.

Since 2012, China has been Africa’s leading trading partner overall, even though it is surpassed by the EU, whose member countries as a whole export less to Africa than China but import nearly twice as much from Africa (189.5 billion compared to China’s 99). With the free trade agreement signed in 2025—which eliminates customs tariffs on 99% of products from over 30 African countries—China intends to open its market to agricultural products and basic manufactured goods from these countries, to strengthen ties with them in general, and to boost investment in this continent, which is still experiencing strong population growth. After World War II, the continent was contested by the former European colonial powers, the U.S., and the USSR—the powers that emerged victorious from World War II and supported decolonization movements to expand their influence—and is now also contested by new emerging powers such as Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, India, and the Chinese superpower.

China has become the leading arms exporter to West and Central Africa, where numerous governments have ousted or limited France’s military and economic presence, while Russia has had to reduce its exports, as it has had to “use up” much of the arms it produces in the war in Ukraine. Turkey and Israel are also stepping into the vacuum left by France: China accounts for 28% of arms exports to West Africa, compared to 14% for France and 11% for Russia and Turkey. China’s largest defense contractor, Norinco, signed a comprehensive supply and assistance agreement with the government of Mali in 2024 during the Malian president’s visit to Beijing. At the same time, the Chinese company Ganfeng has invested in a joint venture with the Australian firm Leo Lithium in the Goulamina mining project in Mali to produce spodumene, from which lithium for batteries is extracted.

The battle to maintain a monopoly in the booming market of lithium for batteries is driving China’s increasing penetration into Africa, after Australia—China’s main supplier of spodumene (accounting for 79% of its imports in 2023)—decided to limit exports in order to develop its own lithium industry through domestic refining. In addition to Mali, Chinese companies have invested billions in mines and refining plants in Zimbabwe, which in 2022 banned the export of raw lithium ore, requiring the construction of spondumene refineries alongside the mines. The spondumene is then exported to China for the final refining process, which yields lithium usable in battery production.

– The Chinese company Sichuan PD Technology Group, a subsidiary of the Yahua Group, has reactivated the Kamativi mine in northwestern Zimbabwe, which it operates jointly with a local minority partner. The mine, which once produced tin with 3,000 workers, had been closed in 1994 following a drop in the metal’s price. In addition to the refinery, a dam was built to supply the necessary water. The projected capacity is 300,000 metric tons per year of spondumene concentrate.

– The Chinese company Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt has invested $300 million in a refinery at the Arcadia mine in Garomomzi (purchased in 2021 from an Australian company for $422 million), with the capacity to process 4.5 million metric tons of ore to produce 400,000 metric tons of concentrate per year.

– In 2023, the Chinese company Sinomine, with an investment of $300 million, opened the Bikita refinery (in Masvingo Province) to produce 240,000 metric tons of spondumene per year, plus 360,000 metric tons of petalite (another material from which lithium is extracted). With 11 million metric tons, Bikita would be the world’s largest known lithium reserve.

– The Chengyin Lithium Group, in turn, has launched another lithium concentrate refinery (an investment of $130 million) at the largely unexplored Sabi Star mine, which it acquired for $77 million.

Chinese companies have also built other lithium refining plants in Ethiopia, Congo, and Namibia. African lithium production tripled in 2024, rising from 4% to 10% of the global total. U.S. companies are at a disadvantage in this battle for lithium on African soil because, following Trump’s protectionist offensive, they have no free trade agreements with African countries, and because Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act requires—in order to qualify for tax credits on electric vehicles— that 40% (rising to 80% by 2027) of the value of electric vehicle batteries must be produced in the U.S. or in the 20 countries with which the U.S. has free trade agreements. In this way, the United States is cutting itself off from African lithium in favor of China, which has a lithium refining capacity 15 times that of the U.S. The U.S. is attempting to make up for this by circumventing the IRA and promising the Congo and Zambia to refine lithium ore on-site and to finance the Lobito Corridor railway (from Zambia to Angola). In Mozambique, the U.S. is also financing the development of graphite mines (for lubricants, batteries, and fuel cells), with the graphite to be refined in Louisiana. Currently, the U.S. is 100% dependent on imports—almost entirely from China—for its graphite supply, and China’s export restrictions on this mineral are pushing the U.S. to seek alternatives.

These significant examples clearly show that Chinese investments in Africa are just as extractivist as those of the former colonial powers, and serve to maintain and strengthen the global monopoly of Chinese companies in the production of materials that have become strategic—a monopoly from which Chinese capital can reap superprofits and exercise economic and political power on a large scale. When Trump’s U.S. administration sought to strangle Chinese exports by imposing astronomical tariffs, China responded by restricting exports of rare earths—other strategic materials—to the U.S., forcing it to back down on the tariffs. In the inter-imperialist confrontation, China possesses economic weapons no less potent than those of the U.S.

The example of Zimbabwe reveals another aspect of the imperialist nature of Chinese capital exports. The production of tobacco—Zimbabwe’s leading export—had plummeted from 260 million kg in 1998 to 48 million kg in 2008 following the expropriation of land from several hundred large white-owned agricultural enterprises and its redistribution to 140,000 small Black farmers, who lacked capital and technical expertise. The Chinese Tianze Tobacco Co., a subsidiary of the Chinese tobacco monopoly CNTC—a giant with revenue of $232 billion in 2024—revived tobacco production through loans to farmers for mechanization, technical consulting, and guaranteed buybacks, has revived tobacco production, which rose in 2025 to 352.7 million kg, worth $1.2 billion, of which 790 million kg were exported to China. In and of itself, promoting this monoculture of a product that—as stated on all cigarette packs—KILLS, is hardly the height of social progress. Now, however, as production has increased, so too has the debt owed to Chinese lenders by tens of thousands of Black farmers, who risk losing the land allocated to them (used as collateral for the loans) if tobacco prices remain low.

And it’s not just about tobacco. From an article in the South China Morning Post on June 15, 2024, titled China Is Not in the Business of Haircuts (a term in financial jargon meaning debt forgiveness), we learn that Zimbabwe’s Minister of Finance, Mthuli Ncube, asked creditor nations to reduce the country’s heavy foreign debt, amounting to $13 billion, of which $6.7 billion was already in default. Zimbabwe’s foreign debt situation had worsened following sanctions imposed by the U.S. in 2001 in response to Mugabe’s expropriation of land from 4,000 white landowners. The Zimbabwean government had subsequently committed to $3.5 billion in compensation (in 2024, it allocated $55 million).

Zimbabwe owes $4.1 billion to the Paris Club (primarily Germany, France, Great Britain, Japan, and the U.S.) and $2.1 billion—one-third of which is past due—to China, which, in addition to investing in lithium, has financed the construction of power plants and airports.

China, like the Paris Club, has refused to write off a portion of the debt. According to an analyst quoted in the article, the Chinese “may negotiate a minerals-for-debt swap.”

This is one more example of the imperialist use of financial power and capital export to plunder other countries’ natural resources: farmers’ land, mineral resources—from lithium to gold. And for the exploitation of the local workforce. A further meaningful example is the Rössing uranium mine in Namibia, which the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) acquired from the Australian company Rio Tinto in 2019 (a 68.6% stake, while the Iranian government holds 15% and the South African IDC holds 10%; the Namibian government holds 3%, with 51% of the voting rights) with a commitment to maintain existing wage and regulatory conditions. But the following year, Chinese management fired nine representatives of the MUN (Mineworkers Union of Namibia), who had refused to accept changes to the agreement that would have worsened conditions regarding vacation time, medical care, wages, and layoffs; they also forced the closure of the MUN union office at the mine, the elimination of union safety representatives, and a reduction in paid sick days.

Although an arbitration panel ruled the dismissals unlawful, management refused to reinstate them, even resorting to bribing government officials (https://namibiadailynews.info/namibian-rossing-mine…/). Accustomed to dealing with pro-management unions controlled by the CCP, Chinese companies—including state-owned ones like CNCC—attack workers’ unions abroad just as aggressively as Western multinationals, which fear boycotts in other countries.

Political conclusions

From this analysis of China’s position with respect to the “features of imperialism” identified by Lenin, it is clear that China, in its impressive last half-century of capitalist development, has fully developed those characteristics of capital concentration, the creation of monopolies, the development of finance capital, and the export of capital (in which it is the world’s first or second largest economy, ahead of or behind the United States, depending on the parameter considered)—a process that inevitably drives the state, which is the expression of that capital, to expand its sphere of economic, political, and military influence on an international, indeed global, scale. [In a future article, we will, of course, address the role of the Chinese state in this entire process – n.]

In Imperialism, Lenin argues against the German Social Democratic leader Karl Kautsky, who maintained that imperialism cannot be equated with “modern capitalism” that has reached a certain stage of development. For Kautsky, imperialism is essentially a policy — a specific, well-defined policy “preferred” by finance capital — consisting in the subjugation and annexation of agricultural territories by industrial capitalist nations. For Lenin, “This definition is of no use at all.” After noting that the objectives of imperialist powers at war with one another go beyond the conquest of agricultural territories and also concern capitalist-developed areas, Lenin points out that “Kautsky detaches the politics of imperialism from its economics, speaks of annexations as being a policy “preferred” by finance capital, and opposes to it another bourgeois policy which, he alleges, is possible on this very same basis of finance capital.… It follows, then, that monopolies in the economy are compatible with non-monopolistic, non-violent, non-annexationist methods in politics; that the territorial division of the world… is compatible with a non-imperialist policy”. Instead, “a “fight” against the policy of the trusts and banks that does not affect the economic basis of the trusts and banks is mere bourgeois reformism and pacifism, the benevolent and innocent expression of pious wishes.” .

Let us bear this in mind today as well: anyone who thinks they can fight imperialism without fighting and overthrowing its economic base — the capitalist system — adorns his/her position with pious wishes, a position that remains entirely within the bourgeois ideal and material horizon. This (pious wishes) is the best-case scenario, because in many other cases it amounts to a conscious manipulation of data and minds in opposition to the revolutionary anti-capitalist perspective.

Returning to China: having developed within itself the economic foundations of imperialism, on par with the old powers of the transatlantic West and Japan, its capital, in its international expansion, inevitably collides with that of its competitors in the subjugation of more labor, the hoarding of raw materials, and the conquest of markets. The idea that China could behave differently—and aim for economic expansion in solidarity with the peoples of other countries—is not backed up by reality, as demonstrated by concrete examples of Chinese expansion in Africa.

To believe that the strong presence of state capital and the centralization of economic strategies through the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can alter the nature of China’s projection abroad also reverses the actual relationships: since the CCP itself has for decades served as a body for mediation among the many Chinese state-owned and private capitalist groups, and for the formulation of a “national” line to which all groups are required to adhere. This line inevitably clashes with those of competing imperialist states; it has found expression in the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) and seeks international mediation and alliances within organizations such as the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and the BRICS+. But this is certainly not a policy of support for oppressed peoples, as demonstrated by China’s ongoing and decisive support for Israel’s economy while this monstrous machine of destruction and death crushed the revolutionary resistance of the Palestinians in Gaza through genocide (1).

China’s rise, which objectively challenges American supremacy by returning the world to a multipolar setup — similar to those that preceded the two world wars — is certainly not a harbinger of peace, as some on the left would like to delude themselves (and others) into believing. On the contrary, it inevitably raises the stakes and drives all capitalist powers toward general rearmament in preparation for a new world war — the latest proof, if any were needed, is the recent NATO summit in Ankara. With its industrial primacy, China possesses the greatest potential in this rearmament drive. Time becomes a crucial factor – this is the reason why European imperialisms are in such a hurry. Ukraine, Sudan, the Congo, Palestine, Lebanon, and Iran are all testing grounds (and laboratories) in this preparation.

In the manner of Kautsky, campist positions reduce the concept of imperialism to the politics of certain states (the U.S. foremost among them) and center their (supposed) “anti-imperialist struggle” on supporting powers that compete with the United States and the EU, effectively enlisting themselves in the camp of Chinese imperialism, passed off as “socialist” (!?) or, at the very least, as “anti-imperialist.” As we have observed repeatedly, this is a repetition of the disastrous mistake made during the years of the Resistance: as long as Nazi-fascism can be defeated, even an alliance with Anglo-American imperialism — passed off as progressive and (to some extent) “liberating” — is acceptable. Only to realize 80 years too late (the Marxists and the most conscious proletarians saw it immediately) that it was and is an imperialism no less ferocious than Nazi-Fascist imperialism, which — unlike the latter — did not last 12 or 22 years, but a century, and is still standing, albeit faltering!

To the supporters of this disastrous perspective who are not ashamed to consider “socialist” a country in which all the typical categories of capitalism dominate (profit, interest, capital and wage labor, commodities, etc.); a country where the right to strike was expelled from the Constitution in 1982; who are not ashamed to call “communist” a party whose ideology has long been blatantly that of “state capitalism”; a party whose workers’ membership is in inexorable decline to less than 9% (in 2021); a party that boasts a growing number of mega-billionaires among its members; a party in which corporate and government executives, professionals, and senior technical staff now make up 40% of its membership…; To these people, we oppose the only liberating perspective, however difficult it may be to achieve: the international and internationalist struggle of the working class to overthrow this infamous and decadent capitalist system of exploitation of man by man and of brutal plundering of nature’s resources, which has generated and continues to generate the endless wars of capital and every other kind of horror.

While writing Imperialism in the spring of 1916, Lenin could not have known that a year and a half later the Bolsheviks would lead a victorious revolution, which would trigger the first great assault on heaven by the international proletariat. Today, the objective, social foundations for the proletarian revolution have matured immensely, with wage workers now constituting the majority of humanity — their most numerous ranks are now found precisely in the new Asian center of gravity of global capital accumulation. But the subjective conditions of our class appear, at present, to be far more backward than they were 110 years ago. And yet, if an enemy of unquestionable political acumen such as Donald Trump puts the fight against “communism,” “red terrorism,” and anti-fascism on the agenda in the United States, there is evidently something simmering beneath the surface in his country and around the world that unsettles him…

And it is precisely on what is brewing beneath the surface (and not always just beneath the surface) in the United States, in Italy, and in Europe that we must focus: to foster a class-conscious and internationalist awareness in the struggles of the working masses to defend their living conditions and against the wave of layoffs on the horizon, in the mobilizations against the sacrifices and the escalation of state and corporate repression that rearmament, the war economy, and the race toward war bring and will continue to bring. Our primary enemy is “at home”: let us never forget that.

And as for China, while there are those who foolishly look to its ruling class, its capitalists, and its “red” neo-Confucian bureaucrats as potential saviors of humanity, we instead look to the vast Chinese proletarian army, which already a century ago in Shanghai and Canton proved its great worth, and reaffirmed itself in the battles that paved the way for the Cultural Revolution and during the Revolution itself (despite everything), in the 1989 workers’ uprising — far more radical and dangerous to the Dengists of China and the entire world than the student uprising — as well as in the decade of major strikes in the early 2000s… In China and Asia, we will certainly not lack comrades in the struggle. A struggle not simply “against the West,” but against capitalism — more exploitative and warmongering today than ever before.

(1)

On the Relations between China and Israel. A Reply to our Critics